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Some Reflections on Debt-for-Equity
Conversions
A debt-for-equity conversion' may be defined as the technique whereby the
holder of a hard-currency-denominated claim against a given country is permit-
ted to exchange the claim for an equity holding in a private entity in the given
country. The conversion presupposes that the given country is so heavily
indebted, and that the risk of not complying with the terms of the hard-currency-
denominated obligation is judged to be so great, that the claim's market value is
substantially less than its nominal value.
The conversion involves several intermediary steps. First, the original holder
of the claim, the lender, may "sell" the loan paper to a third party (typically an
investor or an intermediary) for cash. In so doing, the original lender severs its
relationship with the debtor country. The third party, or the original lender if it
chooses to act directly, may then present its claim to the debtor country and elect
to exchange such claim, at a certain value (face or adjusted value), for equity in local
private firms. Finally, the claim holder receives equity in exchange for local currency
provided by the country's monetary agency as part of the debt-for-equity conversion
(the local currency referred hereinto as "debt-for-equity conversion money").
Under a broader interpretation, a debt-for-equity conversion encompasses the
exchange of a sovereign debt or a private sector debt claim for equity in private
local firms, in companies targeted by privatization programs, or even in public
enterprises. Most debt-for-equity programs, however, involve sovereign debt
claim to be exchanged for equity in private or privatized enterprises.
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1. A debt-for-equity conversion is also called a debt-for-equity swap. This topic is extensively
addressed in newspaper articles, magazines, and certain special reports and studies. See, e.g.,
Buchheit, Converting Sovereign Debt into Equity Investments, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 1986, at 10;
Buchheit, Legal Issues in Trading Sovereign Debt, Im'L FiN. L. REv., Feb. 1986, at 17; Halliwell,
Could Debt-Equity Swaps Make Global Debt Manageable?, 78 ABA BANK. J., Apr. 1984, at 78;
Holden, Debt Equity Swaps, U.S. BANKER, 65 Oct. 1986, at 105; Weinert, Swapping Third World Debt,
FoPRGN POL'y 85 (1986); Getting to Grips With Debt-Equity Swaps, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1987, at 151.
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With the development of the sovereign debt secondary market, debtors and
creditors alike have focused on devising various methods of reducing the debt
burden of developing countries. 2 In many cases, the particular debt-for-equity
conversion technique has proved attractive and has become a popular debt-
reduction mechanism.
Legally, debt-for-equity conversion implies the structuring or restructuring of
several contractual relationships. For instance, the obligations between debtor
and creditor, investor and host country, and foreign shareholder and local
corporate entity can be altered. In addition to issues of contract law, debt-for-
equity conversion touches upon corporate law, tax law, international law (public
and private), and carries other legal and financial implications.
Innovative and complex, debt-for-equity conversion poses a challenge to
governmental regulatory functions. Debt-for-equity conversion forces the host
country to take a position on many aspects of foreign investments. In the case of
home countries of international banks and investors, debt-for-equity conversion
calls for a review of the tax, accounting, and financial rules and regulations
governing entities engaged in foreign investments.
The reflections offered in this article may be organized by reference to the dual
character of debt-for-equity conversion, i.e., as an investment tool, and as a
challenge to regulators. The first part of this article examines debt-for-equity
conversion as an opportunity for increased foreign investments in developing
countries. The second part addresses certain facets of the challenge debt-for-
equity conversion poses to governmental regulatory functions.
I. An Opportunity for Increased Foreign Investments in Debtor Countries
The concept of a New International Economic Order (NIEO)3 fueled much
debate on the question of North-South relations and, in particular, on the nature,
2. The debt problem has dictated a multifaceted approach towards reducing the debt burden.
This approach incorporates a wide choice of instruments and techniques. See generally DEBT
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ADVISORY SERVICES DEPARTMENT, WORLD BANK MARKET-BASED MENU
APPROACH (Jan. 1988); P. KRUGMAN, MARKEr-BASED DEBT REDUCTION SCHEMES (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 2587, May 1988). Among the conversion techniques
are debt-for-nature conversions permitting investments in operations protecting the environment, and
debt-for-charity conversions. Debt-for-equity conversion differs from securitization, which aims at
transforming the debt into a negotiable instrument. For a discussion of securitization, see Plehn,
Securitization of Third World Debt, 23 INT'L LAW. 161 (1989). The debt crisis has spurred a series of
debt-reduction innovations. For an analysis of the debt-crisis inspired changes in international capital
markets and the consequences for developing countries, see, e.g., F. LEROUX, EVOLUTION SUR LES
MARCHIS INTERNATIONAUX DES CAPITAUX ET PERSPECTIVES POUR LES PAYS EN DgVELOPPEMENT (Centre
d'ltudes en Administration Internationale, Jan. 1987); see also Dooley, Buy-Backs and Market
Evaluation of External Debt, 35 IMF STAFF PAPERS 215 (June 1988).
3. The subject of New International Economic Order has generated much literature. For a
discussion of the subject as it relates to third world finance, see, e.g., Adede, Legal Trends in
International Lending and Investment in Developing Countries, 180 ACADtMIE DE DROrr INTERNA-
TIONAL 12 (1983 II) (part of the collected courses of the Hague Academy of International Law).
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scope, and legal requirements of foreign investments in developing countries.
When debt-for-equity conversion became perceived as yet another foreign
investment technique, most of the questions linked to NIEO (such as foreign
ownership of domestic assets, repatriation of capital and/or profits, technology
transfer) resurfaced. It would seem, however, that, in the context of debt-for-
equity conversion, these same questions are being addressed as specific issues to
be resolved, and not as general claims imposed on investors.
A. ANALYSIS OF DEBT-FOR-EQuITY CONVERSION TECHNIQUE
4
From the host country perspective, the debt-for-equity conversion can be
viewed as a means to foster foreign investments.
1. Overview of Selected Debt-for-Equity Conversion Programs
A dozen debt-troubled countries have formally adopted debt-for-equity con-
version programs both as a debt-reduction scheme and as an incentive for foreign
investments. Depending on the debt situation of the particular country, the
program may be justified more by the need for reducing the debt burden rather
than the need to foster investments. In other countries, typically where the debt
situation is not alarming, the program may place an emphasis on the foreign
investment aspect.
The contents of the program vary from country to country. Regulations usually
divide the debt-for-equity conversion transaction itself into two sequential
exchange transactions: the initial exchange, between the original lender, of its
nominal claim, and the subsequent holder of the loan paper after purchase at
market rates; the second, between the subsequent holder and the country's
authorities, in relation to the investment per se.
A comparative analysis of debt-for-equity regulations reveals that five issues
are potentially relevant to the examination of the regulatory environment of
debt-for-equity conversion in debtor countries. These issues are either specifi-
cally addressed in regulations or are subject to the discretion of the authorities in
debtor countries. To a large extent, the failure or success of any debt-for-equity
conversion program depends on the degree of certainty and clarity with which
these issues are addressed.
a. Compliance with Existing Rules and Regulations Governing
Foreign Investments
Explicitly or implicitly, debt-for-equity conversion programs in all countries
refer to the existing principles governing foreign investments. When a specific
4. See generally S. RUBIN, GUIDE TO DEBT EQUITY SwAPs 33 (The Economist Publications,
Special Report No. 1104, 1987); Ganitsky & Lema, Foreign Investment Through Debt-Equity Swaps,
29 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 21 (1988). For a history of debt-for-equity and its implications on foreign
investments in developing countries, see UNCTAD, THE ROLE OF FoREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: CURRENT IssuEs (TD/B/C,3/196, Dec. 14, 1984).
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debt-for-equity regulation is silent on questions like technology transfer require-
ments, transfer pricing, profit repatriation, or employment rules, it would mean
that existing rules in the specific area apply. In countries where the attitude to
foreign investments has been traditionally conservative, a conflict has arisen
between the relatively aggressive law and policy governing debt-for-equity
conversion schemes and the existing rather reticent legal background. In these
cases, foreign investors have expressed concern as to the legal obstacles facing
the implementation of their investment programs under debt-for-equity conver-
sion.
b. Investment Sector and Geographic Location
Many programs favor certain priority sectors and certain geographic areas by
offering additional advantages for foreign investors who operate in these sectors
and/or in those regions. These preferred sectors, traditionally identified in almost
all investment codes, have determined the eligibility of foreign investors for
specific advantages.
c. Taxation Treatment
Often the tax treatment of debt-for-equity conversion operations and entities is
uncertain both in host countries and in home countries. Little is known on the
valuation question and on the domestic and international tax treatment of gains
or losses resulting from debt-for-equity conversion's initial transactions and
subsequent operations and exchanges.
d. The Debt-for-Equity Conversion Transaction Itself
Certain regulations introduce a distinction between exchange of local currency
at official market rates and exchange at par. In some cases, exchange at par is
reserved for priority investments.
Certain regulations govern the matching of funds; foreign investors would thus
be required to match, wholly or partially, the amount of debt-for-equity
conversion money with fresh funds brought in as hard currency and exchanged
locally. The same regulations also often require the recipient to use the
debt-for-equity conversion money in specific equity investments, prohibiting the
use of these funds at will.
e. Eligibility
There appears to be two types of regulations in this regard. Regulations of the
first type set forth a series of requirements that, once complied with, allow access
to the use of the debt-for-equity conversion without further authority. In that
case, compliance with the requirements makes access to the debt-for-equity
conversion program automatic. The second type of regulations mandates a
case-by-case approach, where the authorities enjoy large discretion.
In addition to the eligibility of applicants, regulations also address the
eligibility of debt that could come under debt-for-equity conversion programs.
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Typically, only previously restructured sovereign medium- and long-term claims
are being considered eligible.
Finally, it should be noted that most regulations are geared toward foreign
entrepreneurs, thereby specifically prohibiting local investors from operating
under debt-for-equity conversion programs. In one case, however, as a measure
to reduce capital flight, an amnesty program has been designed allowing
residents to repatriate certain eligible foreign debt, purchased outside of the




The impact of debt-for-equity conversion on debtor countries' economic and
legal structures can be significant. When, in the context of the NIEO debate,
many developing countries become aware of the cost dimension of foreign
investments, they slowly reoriented their approaches to a cost-benefit analysis of
foreign investments.6
To a host country and to an investor, the operation of a debt-for-equity
conversion scheme brings certain benefits but also generates certain costs.
Without elaborating on an economic comparison of costs and benefits nor
deciding on the economic validity of such scheme, certain general observations
may be formulated. 7
1. Advantages
Debt-for-equity conversion, as yet another foreign investment technique,
supports debtor countries' investment and privatization policies. By allowing the
foreign investor to benefit from at least a part of the discount in the secondary
market, the authorities in debtor countries offer an undeniable incentive to the
foreign investor.
Debt-for-equity conversion, as a debt-reduction mechanism, helps alleviate
the debt obligation of debtor countries, albeit to a limited extent. In this regard,
5. Blackwell & Noura, Impact of Debt to Equity Conversion, FIN. & DEV., June 1988, at 15;
Jedlicki, La Conversion de crances dans les pays d6biteurs: De ses incidences d ses limites, 29 REVUE
TIERS-MONDE 39 (1988). The experience of specific countries in debt-for-equity conversion has been
the subject of wide treatment. See, e.g., N. DYTAQUIN & I. SICAT, DEBT-TO-EQUITY CONVERSION: THE
PHILLiPPINE EXPERIENCE (1988); R. WaRRETr, GUIDE TO DEBT-EQUITY SWAPPING IN KEY LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES (1987) (special report published by the Latin American Information Services Inc.); Cayo
de Abreu, Peru's Debt Equity Conversion Guidelines, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 1988, at 36; Paz &
Tecson, Argentina's Debt to Equity Conversion Program, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1988, at 81-87;
Tucker, Debt-for-Equity Swaps in Mexico, 23 TEx. J. INT'L L. 443 (1988); Debt Conversion, 65
TRAoE FIN., Sept. 1988, 42-49.
6. Maktouf & Surrey, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Tax and Budgetary Reform in Less
Developed Countries, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739 (1983).
7. For an analysis of the advantages and drawbacks of debt-for-equity swaps from the vantage
point of a developing country, see L. Buchheit, Debt Equity Conversion Programmes from the
Debtor Country's Perspective, in S. RUnN, supra note 4, at 33.
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the adoption of debt-for-equity conversion on the part of the debtor country
translates into a decision against debt-forgiveness, at least for the portion of the
debt subject to conversion. In this sense, debt-for-equity conversion serves as a
country's recognition of its debt obligation.
In addition to the quantitative impact, 8 which can be measured only with
relative accuracy, there appears to be a certain qualitative impact. Under
debt-for-equity conversion schemes, the classic unconditional flow of goods,
capital, and technology, which usually characterizes the North-South relation-
ship, seems to have gradually given way to a more responsible relationship. In
comparison to the traditional foreign investment programs, host countries seem
to be acting more carefully in operating debt-for-equity conversion programs.
For example, sometimes these countries decide to halt debt-for-equity conversion
programs temporarily for reconsideration. Due to the interaction between
debt-for-equity conversion and such fundamental issues as the management of
monetary and financial policies, privatization programs, 9 taxation policy, invest-
ment programs, regional development, and overall regulatory environment, the
host countries devote particular attention to the operation and regulation of
debt-for-equity conversion.
This change in attitude toward foreign investment accompanying the adoption
of debt-for-equity conversion may be characterized as cautious yet responsible.
In most instances, sectors of the economy open to debt-for-equity conversion
are specifically identified and the type of eligible loans has been restrictively
defined.
2. Drawbacks
Debt-for-equity conversion may be analyzed as a departure from the norma-
tive and traditional approach to foreign investments, in that this debt-reduction
mechanism offers exceptional advantages to certain foreign investors. These
advantages, generally not accessible to local investors or foreign investors
outside the debt-for-equity conversion setting, may create discrimination.
In comparison to local investors (assumed to have no access to foreign
exchange), foreign investors operating under debt-for-equity conversion pro-
grams enjoy a benefit resulting from the discount on the secondary market in
obtaining local currency. Such an edge may prove damaging and frustrating in
cases where privatized firms become open to equity participation from foreign
investors contributing debt-for-equity conversion money.
Where it is not mandatory to use debt-for-equity conversion money solely for
the purchase of stock in local firms, the availability of such relatively cheaper
8. Hector, Swaps Can Shrink Latin Debt-A Little, FORTUNE, Aug. 18, 1986, at 59; Hellinwell,
Could Debt-Equity Swap Make Global Debt Manageable?, 78 ABA BANK. J. 78 (1984).
9. In this context, see I C. VNYLSTEKE, ThCHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE OWNED
ENTERPRISES 147 (World Bank Technical Paper Number 88, 1988).
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local currency may lead to potentially harmful arbitrage opportunities' 0 whereby
debt-for-equity conversion money is used to purchase black market hard
currency. This risk is limited, however, because most countries, with the
exception of one debtor country, provide that debt-for-equity conversion money
be destined only for investments in local equity.
II. A Challenge to Governmental Regulatory Functions
Debt-for-equity conversion has triggered a host of regulatory initiatives in
various debtor countries. To foreign lenders and investors, however, many of
these countries stopped short of fashioning the appropriate legal framework. In
the home countries of investors and original lenders, the growing array of tax,
accounting, and financial regulations makes it more desirable for these original
lenders and investors to engage in debt-for-equity conversion.
A. THE CASE OF DEBTOR COUNTRIES
1. Financial Regulations
One of the most crucial aspects of debt-for-equity conversion relates to the
regulation of the financial transaction itself. By controlling access to eligible
debt, amount of redemption, eligible sectors, and valuation rules, national
authorities control access to debt-for-equity conversion itself, enabling them to
monitor their programs more efficiently. In situations where additional or special
incentives are needed to promote a particular sector or a particular region (or
both), the authorities are able to release and monitor additional corresponding
advantages.
The regulation of access to the discounted debt market usually also affects the
level of redemption (in local currency) allowed. While, in principle, debtor
countries actually exchange 100 percent of the loan paper's face value for local
currency, many countries, in practice, do retain a fraction of the discount (usually
up to 10 percent) from the face value equivalent. Should these countries wish to
encourage a particular activity or area, they then offer a full face value
redemption.
In addition to regulating debt-for-equity conversion as a financial transaction,
issues such as repatriation of profits and minimum reinvestment requirements
arise. Foreign investors insist on the freedom to repatriate profits or a significant
part thereof.
Repatriation quickly triggers the related question of flight capital. All
developing countries, and certainly the debtor countries, have designed mecha-
nisms to prevent capital flight to protect their financial systems from the
depletion of hard currency. The line between allowing profit repatriation and
10. See, e.g., S. RUBIN, supra note 4, at 37.
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combatting flight capital is often difficult to draw. In this regard, debt-for-equity
conversion compels debtor countries to review their laws and better regulate the
potential new flow of investments.
2. Tax Aspects
The 1960s saw a spectacular surge of investment codes offering limitless,
sometimes outrageous, often unnecessary incentives. The investment code was
seen as a panacea for growth and development. Many countries adopted this
technique without regard to the budgetary consequences or other resultant costs,
and paying minimal attention to the real investment incentives required, i.e.,
infrastructure, labor skills, political stability, bureaucratic flexibility.
These excessive advantages granted on paper failed to attract the expected
volume of investments. The ensuing disappointment gradually led developing
countries to rethink their entire approach toward attracting and regulating foreign
investments. The result was the NIEO philosophy, calling for major reform of
North-South economic relationships.
Under investment codes, the typical tax advantages offered to foreign
investors extend to total or partial exemptions from personal and corporate
taxation, withholding tax in case of repatriation or distribution, import levies,
and even indirect taxation in certain cases. The tax advantages also often spread
over a period of up to ten or twenty years.
Debt-for-equity conversion, given its relative sophistication, calls for a more
careful tax regime. The authorities would have to qualify the tax status of the new
shareholder and the value of its contribution as well as the tax status of any
remittances. Another issue to face is the tax treatment of gains or losses resulting
from currency exchange.
B. THE CASE OF CREDITOR HOME COUNTRIES
Under the pressure exercised by creditor banks and investors on their home
governments, many regulatory changes have been adopted in the taxation and
accounting fields; however, many other changes are still required to make




To face the risk of loss on their loans, banks have set up provisions allowing
them to prepare for the case when their loans are not reimbursed. 12 Since the
11. G. BIRD, COMMERCIAL BANK PROVISIONING AGAINST CLAIMS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (The
World Bank, Working Paper No. 121, Oct. 1988).
12. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, STUDY
ON ACCOUNTING AND REGULATORY POLICIES AFFECTING DEBT RESTRUCTURING [hereinafter STUDY ON
ACCOUNTING].
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inception of the debt crisis, provisioning became all the more significant, as the
risk of loan-loss became all the greater.
Provisioning proved to be one of the most significant bargaining chips at the
disposal of banks in their negotiations with the debtor countries. The higher the
provisions, the more powerful is the lender in reconsidering the terms of its
claim.
The significance of provisioning has led creditor banks to assert great pressure
on their governments to be allowed to set provisioning at the highest levels
possible. The level of provisioning is subject to two important regulatory
caveats. The first one is the extent to which provisions are "capitalized"; the
second is, of course, the tax deductibility.
With the most notable exception of two industrialized countries, provisions are
not included in banks' capital and thus, do not further the banks' lending capacity.
Furthermore, in many countries, earmarking limits the use of funds set aside as
provisions.
By contrast to the limited availability of "capitalization," tax deductibility is
more generously available at the stage of a provision, i.e., prior to realization and
recognition of losses. In certain countries, however, regulations require actual
loss realization and recognition before allowing tax deductibility.
Considered as being proper and "good-business" practice, provisioning was
made mandatory in certain countries, where levels as high as 40 percent were
set. Where provisioning is mandatory, tax deductibility is obviously available.
It should be noted that, in accounting for debt-for-equity conversion, banks are
generally allowed to consider as loss the discount at which their hard-currency-
denominated loan is exchanged. Such loss may be absorbed through setup
reserves.
The swift regulatory response to provisioning allowed banks to envisage a
broad variety of debt-reduction mechanisms, including debt-for-equity conver-
sion, and to strengthen their bargaining power in renegotiating sovereign debt.
2. Equity Holdings by Banks
As seen earlier, debt-for-equity conversion may be a triangular transaction,
where the original lender disposes of its claim, at a discount, in favor of an
investor. The investor then trades the loan paper for local currency to be used in
the purchase of equity in local concerns. In other cases, the original lender may
decide to trade its discounted claim directly for an equity holding in a private or
privatized concern in the debtor country. This option raises the question of
conflict between the traditional fiduciary function attributed to the lender,
typically a bank, and the freedom to hold equity, sometimes at high levels, in
private enterprises.
In most countries, equity holdings by banks are strictly regulated. Limitations
are thus imposed on the amount and the scope of these holdings. These
limitations may inhibit lenders from engaging directly in debt-for-equity con-
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versions. U.S. federal regulators have, on two occasions, amended their rules to
allow U.S. banks broader authority to convert the public sector debt of certain
debtor countries into equity participation in nonfinancial private companies in
those countries.' 
3
According to many U.S. banks, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, by allowing
under the 1988 amendment to Regulation K as much as 40 percent ownership in
private sector enterprises, has responded positively to pressure from U.S. banks
constantly in search of solutions to the debt imbroglio. In the view of several
commentators, the relaxation of equity holding rules, however, does not change
the U.S. Federal Reserve Board's cautious attitude towards the risk of excessive
involvement of U.S. banks in nonfinancial activities in debt-troubled developing
countries.
3. Tax Treatment of Gains or Losses14
In most industrialized countries the tax consequences of debt restructuring are
not totally clear. The relative novelty and complexity of some of the debt-
reduction techniques have created difficulties for many tax authorities.
From a tax viewpoint, debt-for-equity conversion may be analyzed as a
sequence of exchanges. Every exchange may be absolutely neutral when values
exchanged are of exact amount. In most cases, however, given the discount
element, exchanges result in gain or loss, whether recognized or not. The tax
qualification of gain or loss is often a decisive factor in an investor's decision to
proceed with an operation based on debt-for-equity conversion. The gain or loss
issue is intimately linked to the valuation of the amount of the discount and to the
valuation of the assets in debtor countries' private or privatized firms.
In the case of the United States' 5 Revenue Ruling 87-12416 addressed the
debt-for-equity conversion, which was analyzed as a sequence of two exchanges.
In the first transaction, the investor exchanges eligible debt claim for debt-for-
equity conversion money. In the second exchange, the debt-for-equity conver-
sion money is contributed to the local firm's capital in exchange for the company
stock. In determining the "amount realized" based on the fair market value of
13. Rowntree, Broadening the Scope of Regulation K, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1988, at 31;
STUDY ON ACCOUrTNG, supra note 12.
14. See generally Andreae, Fiscalit et "Debt-Equity Swaps," in LA CAPITALISATION DE LA DErrE
IXTEREURE DES 9TATS 120 (Proceedings of the Office de Formation et de Documentation Intematio-
nale, held at the Hotel Lutetia-Concords, Paris, Jan. 21, 1988) (comparing the American and French
experiences); Presentations from the Conference on Strategies for Reducing the Debt of Developing
Countries, a regional meeting of the American Society of International Law, held at American
University, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 31, 1989).
15. Rey, "U.S. Tax Aspects of Debt Rescheduling and Debt Equity Swaps," Presentation at the
International Bar Association's 22nd Biannual Conference (Sept. 1988).
16. Disnne, Rev. Ruling on Debt/Equity Swaps Leaves Unanswered Questions to the Delight of
the Tax Bar, 39 TAx NoTEs 166 (1988); Terry, Debt-Equity Swaps: Analysis ofRev. Rul. 87-124, 17
TAx MoNT. INT'L J. 151 (1988). For the full text, see 47 FED. REV. BULL. 5 (Nov. 23, 1987).
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the assets received in the exchange, U.S. tax authorities refer to the "facts and
circumstances" of the exchange. Some tax practitioners and banks find the basis
of this determination rather uncertain.
Other tax issues, not raised in the 1987 ruling, are also of crucial importance
to the success to debt-for-equity conversion. For example, the international tax
implications of this dual exchange must be addressed in the context of the foreign




The immense magnitude of the debt problem has forced all parties to adopt an
approach characterized by flexibility in the decision-making process and diver-
sity in the instruments designed to reduce the debt burden. The debt has affected
all underlying legal structures' 8 and subjected the legal systems of all countries
involved to the reconsideration of some of their most fundamental tenets with
regard to accounting,' 9 taxation, foreign ownership of domestic assets, and
investments.
Debt-for-equity conversion is merely one device among the broad array of
debt-reduction instruments available. The particular enthusiasm noted in favor of
debt-for-equity conversion may be explained by the cooperative spirit underlying
the transaction itself: it represents an earnest attempt on the part of both debtors
and creditors to cooperate in resolving the debt imbroglio.
20
The amounts involved in debt-for-equity conversion transactions need not be
colossal to justify the usefulness of the tool. This and other debt reduction
devices ought to be observed and appraised in their sum. At the very least, the
operation of debt-for-equity conversion has shown the role of regulators to be
vital. Depending on the situation, both host and home countries' regulators must
exercise their responsibilities of caution, resolution, and vision.
17. See generally B. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOREION CORPORATIONS: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPARISON (1986).
18. In the case of Mexico, see Vdsquez Pando, The Mexican Debt Crisis In Perspective: Faulty
Legal Structures and Aftershocks, 23 TEX. INr'L L.J. 171 (1988).
19. Speiker, Debt-Equity Swapping: Reconsidering Accounting Guidelines, 26 COLUM. INT'L L.J.
377 (1988).
20. Illingworth, Debt-to-Equity Swaps Benefit Borrowers: Lender and Debtor No Longer in a
Hostile Situation During Debt Crisis, 1988 J. COM. 5c, 13c; Rhodes, Voluntary measures are already
working, Fin. Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at 21, col. F.29.
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